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Copyright and the Shape of Digital Culture Tarleton Gillespie published June 1, 2007 by The MIT Press
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acknowledgments
The emergence of new technologies tends to disrupt the balances within this legal regime that manage its structural tensions. Like many technologies before it, the Internet made visible ambiguities that copyright law had not had to deal with before, and afforded an opportunity for those most invested in the workings of copyright law to tip the scales to their benefit. In response, traditional content industries and self-appointed Internet enthusiasts made very different claims for how the distribution of culture would work in a digital age, and how copyright should change to accommodate it. This largely theoretical dispute became all too real with the arrival and astounding popularity of Napster and peer-to-peer file-trading. This chapter offers a quick and dirty history of the music industry's legal attempts to shut down the deluge of unauthorized music sharing, and introduces the technical solutions being proposed: digital rights management (DRM), a means of encrypting digital content in order to limit access to it; and the "trusted system," a scheme whereby hardware and software authorized to access encrypted content will police what can be done with that content. The chapter ends by introducing some of the concerns that have already been raised about this shift to DRM as a copyright solution, particularly around its implications for the fair use doctrine of copyright law.
However, while technologies can have political consequences, and the move to install DRM encryption systems into digital distribution of culture seems to depend only on technology's ability to do so, an exclusive focus on technology would mask the way it requires much more than mere objects to effectively regulate the movement of culture. To the extent that the actors powerful in this negotiation about the meaning and purpose of a technology are also often powerful in other domains, they can appeal to law, policy, and public discourse to buttress and normalize the authority of the tools they build. Alongside the new technologies come new laws to back them, new institutional and commercial arrangements to produce and align them, and new cultural justifications to convince legislators and users to embrace them. This is not engineering culture through technology, but a more heterogeneous effort to regulate through the alignment of political, technical, legal, economic, and cultural elements that must be held in place for a new paradigm of copyright to take hold.
In his role as the director of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the U.S. film industry's powerful lobbying organization, Jack Valenti was the most powerful and articulate of the storytellers, offering up a narrative arc that went something like this: Movie production is an economic boon to the nation; Internet file-trading is a financial danger to that business; content producers, faced with this threat, will withhold valuable content and the medium in question will suffer; however, with stronger copyright protection and technical measures of self-enforcement, the culture industry will provide a rich consumer experience. The entire chain of assertions was wrapped in a narrative of good beset by evil, coated with dramatic metaphors and salacious scares, and contrasted against a rosy alternative only possible if copyright law were strengthened. Valenti's logic is just one version of the situation, and has been contested on a number of fronts. Nevertheless, it is slowly becoming the standard understanding of how copyright does and should work, and how digital culture depends on the fullest imposition of technical copy protection.
In this case, the trusted system also required recourse to the law when that arrangement was breached, as it was when a "crack" called DeCSS was posted online. The industry turned to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), itself a dramatic shift in copyright law produced by the rethinking of copyright around the Internet and, in particular, the powerful "Valenti logic" offered by the content industries. Prohibiting circumvention of technical protections rather than copying itself, the DMCA embodies this shift toward technical solutions, while also revealing that the technology cannot function without support from the law. Rather than regulating users, the DMCA shores up the arrangements imposed by the content industries on the manufacturers, and forms the fourth side of this heterogeneous square of regulation: technical artifact, commercial agreement, cultural justification, legal authority. And it does so in a way that allows these industries to impose new controls on users that were not available under copyright law before this moment. The trusted system, then, is built on a fundamental mistrust - a mistrust of the technology manufacturers, who must be licensed into submission, and a mistrust of users, who are seen as immoral pirates until they can be technologically compelled to be good consumers.
Ideological gaps between these industries, and between these industries and the regulators who have jurisdiction over them, have always been narrow; nevertheless, they have been important in preventing an industry view of copyright law from completely dominating other public interests. Now these gaps are closing around technical copyright protection, thanks in part to the efforts of these industries, the increasing sense of the inevitability of this project (and thus the desire of manufacturers to be on the winning side of its commercial consequences), and the persuasive power of the piracy narrative. This suggests that, whether or not such trusted systems are ever installed and ever succeed, the changes in industry alignment being pursued in order to produce them may themselves have consequences for culture and technology. This may extend to the increasingly close ideological partnership of the content industries and legislators. However, as the broadcast flag case reveals, the FCC did make significant adjustments to the plans proposed by the movie industry and its consumer electronics partners. Furthermore, the courts subsequently decided that the FCC did not have the authority to install such a technical control regime, revealing further cracks in the political alignments necessary for a comprehensive trusted system to work.
The attempts thus far to impose technical solutions onto the promiscuity of the Internet have all faced intrepid users who refuse these constraints: from the casual users of peer-to-peer networks to the amateur DJs creating innovative forms of digitally reworked music; from the widespread use of "black market" circumvention technologies to the hackers that take on every new system; from academic critics who challenge these strategies to the campus activists who mobilize against them. This kind of agency with culture and with technology has been the biggest hurdle for content owners' attempt to realign digital culture in more commercially viable terms. In some ways, it is this agency that must be curtailed if the broad and heterogeneous strategy of technolegal control is to succeed. Chapter 8 turns its attention to the robustness requirements that accompany most DRM systems, which require manufacturers of hardware and software not only to limit what users can and cannot do, but also to design their tools to fend off the attacks of hackers, the prying eyes of hardware enthusiasts, the curiosity of tinkerers.
Chapter 9 attempts to step back from these cases in order to consider the cultural implications of the technology at the heart of these protec- tion schemes. Once a mechanism for ensuring secret communication between confidantes, encryption is being employed here for a very different purpose: extending control over otherwise public materials. In terms of the distribution of culture over the Internet, encryption is the digital means to assure a subtle, complex, and context-sensitive system of regulation. By encoding a film, the owner of the copyright can dictate to an unprecedented degree what can and cannot be done with it. Most importantly from a philosophical perspective, encryption intervenes before an infringement occurs rather than after. Such a preemptive measure not only treats all users as would-be criminals, it makes the imposition of copyright less open to exceptions like fair use, renders unavailable the ability to challenge a law through civil disobedience, and undercuts the individual's sense of moral agency in a way that can undermine the legitimacy of the rule itself.
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